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Abstract
Philosophers of science increasingly recognize the importance of idealization: the intentional introduction
of distortion into scientific theories. Yet this recognition has not yielded consensus about the nature of
idealization. Thee literature of the past thirty years contains disparate characterizations and justifications,
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ree Kinds of Idealization1
Michael Weisberg
University of Pennsylvania
forthcoming in e Journal of Philosophy
Philosophers of science increasingly recognize the importance of idealization: the
intentional introduction of distortion into scientiﬁc theories. Yet this recognition has not
yielded consensus about the nature of idealization. e literature of the past thirty years
contains disparate characterizations and justiﬁcations, but little evidence of convergence
towards a common position.
Despite this lack of convergence, consensus has clustered around three types of
positions, or three kinds of idealization. While their proponents typically see these
positions as competitors, I will argue that they actually represent three important strands
in scientiﬁc practice. Philosophers disagree about the nature of idealization because there
are three major reasons scientists intentionally distort their models and theories; all three
kinds of idealization play important roles in scientiﬁc research traditions.
e existence of three kinds of idealization means that some classic, epistemic
questions about idealization will not have unitary answers. We cannot expect a single
answer to questions such as: What exactly constitutes idealization? Is idealization
compatible with realism? Are idealization and abstraction distinct? Should theorists work
to eliminate idealizations as science progresses? Are there rules governing the rational use
of idealization, or should a theorist’s intuition alone guide the process? However, the three
kinds of idealization share enough in common to allow us to approach the answers to
these questions in a uniﬁed way. e key is to focus not just on the practice and products
of idealization, but on the goals governing and guiding it. I call these goals the
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representational ideals of theorizing. Although they vary between the three kinds of
idealization, attending to them will help us better understand the epistemic role of this
practice.

I.  ree Kinds of Idealization
Since the early 1980s, philosophers of science have paid increasing attention to the
importance of idealization in scientiﬁc inquiry. While earlier literature acknowledged its
existence, the pioneering studies of Nancy Cartwright2, Ernan McMullin3, Leszek Nowak4,
William Wimsatt5, and others paved the way for the contemporary philosophical literature
on the topic. rough much of my discussion, I will follow Cartwright’s characterization
and talk about theoretical representation in terms of modeling, the indirect representation
of real world phenomena with models.6 But many of the ideas in this paper are not
essentially tied to modeling, so my reliance on the model-based idiom should not be seen
as aﬃrming this connection.
One of the most important insights of the modern idealization literature is that
idealization should be seen as an activity that involves distorting theories or models, not
simply a property of the theory-world relationship. is suggests that in order to
distinguish between the three types of idealization we will need to know what activity is
characteristic of that form of idealization and how that activity is justiﬁed. ese activities
and justiﬁcations can be grouped into three kinds of idealization: Galilean idealization,
minimalist idealization, and multiple-models idealization.
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Galilean idealization
Galilean idealization is the practice of introducing distortions into theories with
the goal of simplifying theories in order to make them computationally tractable. One
starts with some idea of what a non-idealized theory would look like. en one mentally
and mathematically creates a simpliﬁed model of the target.
Galilean idealization has been thoroughly characterized and defended by
McMullin who sees the point of this kind of idealization as “grasp[ing] the real world
from which the idealization takes its origin”7 by making the problem simpler, and hence
more tractable. Galileo employed the technique both in theoretical and experimental
investigations. Although this paper is concerned with the former, Galileo’s vivid
description of the experimental version is useful for conceptualizing the basic notion of
Galilean idealization. When discussing the determination of gravitational acceleration in
the absence of a medium devoid of resistance, Galileo suggests a kind of experimental
idealization:
We are trying to investigate what would happen to moveables very diverse in
weight, in a medium quite devoid of resistance, so that the whole diﬀerence of
speed existing between these moveables would have to be referred to inequality of
weight alone. … Since we lack such a space, let us (instead) observe what happens
in the thinnest and least resistant media, comparing this with what happens in
others less thin and more resistant.8
Lacking a medium devoid of resistance, Galileo suggests that we can make some progress
on the problem by initially using an experimental setup similar to the envisioned
situation. Aer understanding this system, the scientist systematically removes the eﬀect
of the introduced distortion. e same type of procedure can be carried out in theorizing:
introduction of distortion to make a problem more tractable, then systematic removal of
the distorting factors.
7

McMullin, p. 248. A similar account is developed by Nowak; see Leszek Nowak, “The Idealizational
Approach to Science: A Survey,” in J. Brzezinski and L. Nowak (eds.), Idealization III: Approximation and
Truth, vol. 25 of Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, pp. 9–63, 1992.
Rodopi, Amsterdam.
8
Quoted in McMullin, p. 267.
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Galilean idealization is justiﬁed pragmatically. We simplify to more
computationally tractable theories in order to get traction on the problem. If the theorist
had not idealized, she would have been in a worse situation, stuck with an intractable
theory. Since the justiﬁcation is pragmatic and tied to tractability, advances in
computational power and mathematical techniques should lead the Galilean idealizer to
de-idealize, removing distortion and adding back detail to her theories. With such
advances, McMullin argues, “models can be made more speciﬁc by eliminating
simplifying assumptions and ‘de-idealization’, as it were. e model then serves as the
basis for a continuing research program.”9 us the justiﬁcation and rationale of Galilean
idealization is not only pragmatic, it is highly sensitive to the current state of a particular
science.
Galilean idealization is important in research traditions dealing with
computationally complex systems. Computational chemists, for example, calculate
molecular properties by computing approximate wavefunctions for molecules of interest.
At ﬁrst, all but the simplest systems were intractable. When electronic computers were
introduced to computational chemistry, calculated wavefunctions remained crude
approximations, but more complex, chemically interesting systems could be handled. As
computational power has continued to increase in the 21st century, it has become possible
to compute extremely accurate (but still approximate) wavefunctions for moderate sized
molecules. eorists in this tradition aim to develop ever better approximations for
molecular systems of even greater complexity.10 ese techniques are still approximate,
but research continues to bring computational chemists closer to the goal of “[calculating]
the exact solution to the Schrödinger equation, the limit toward which all approximate
methods strive.”11
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McMullin, p. 261
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is example nicely summarizes the key features of Galilean idealization. e
practice is largely pragmatic; theorists idealize for reasons of computational tractability.
e practice is also non-permanent. Galilean idealization takes place with the expectation
of future de-idealization and more accurate representation.
Minimalist idealization
Minimalist idealization is the practice of constructing and studying theoretical
models that include only the core causal factors which give rise to a phenomenon. Such a
representation is oen called a minimal model of the phenomenon. Put more explicitly, a
minimalist model contains only those factors that make a diﬀerence to the occurrence and
essential character of the phenomenon in question.
A classic example of a minimalist model in the physical sciences is the Ising model.
is simple model represents atoms, molecules, or other particles as points along a line
and allows these points to be in one of two states. Originally, Ernst Ising developed this
model to investigate the ferromagnetic properties of metals. It was further developed and
extended to study many other phenomena of interest involving phase changes and
critical phenomena. e model is powerful and allows qualitative and some quantitative
parameters of substances to be determined. But it is extremely simple, building in almost
no realistic detail about the substances being modeled. What it seems to capture are the
interactions and structures that really make a diﬀerence, or the core causal factors giving
rise to the target phenomenon.
Among recent discussions of idealization in the philosophical literature, minimalist
idealization has been the most comprehensively explored position. As such, there is some
diversity among the articulations of this position. One view is Michael Strevens’ kairetic
account of scientiﬁc explanation. Strevens’ account of explanation is causal; to explain a
phenomenon is to give a causal story about why that phenomenon occurred. What makes
Strevens’ account distinct is that the explanatory causal story is limited to only those
factors that made a diﬀerence to the occurrence of the phenomenon. “Making a
diﬀerence” is a fairly intuitive notion, but Strevens deﬁnes it explicitly in terms of what
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he calls “causal entailment,”12 which involves logical entailment in a causal model. A
causal factor makes a diﬀerence to a phenomenon just in case its removal from a causal
model prevents the model from entailing the phenomenon’s occurrence. A causal model
of the diﬀerence-making factors alone is called a canonical explanation of the target
phenomenon.
For Strevens, idealization is the introduction of false but non-diﬀerence-making
causal factors to a canonical explanation. In explaining Boyle’s law, for example, theorists
oen introduce the assumption that gas molecules do not collide with each other. is
assumption is false; collisions do occur in low-pressure gases. However, low-pressure gases
behave as if there were no collisions. is means that collisions make no diﬀerence to the
phenomenon and are not included in the canonical explanation. eorists’ explicit
introduction of the no-collision assumption is a way of asserting that collisions are
actually irrelevant and make no diﬀerence.13 Even with this added, irrelevant factor, the
model is still minimalist because it accurately captures the core causal factors.
Other accounts of minimalist idealization associate minimalism with generation of
the canonical explanation alone. Robert Batterman’s account of asymptotic explanation is
an example of such a view. Asymptotic methods are used by physicists to study the
behavior of model systems at the limits of certain physical magnitudes. ese methods
allow theorists to study how systems would behave when certain eﬀects are removed,
which allows the construction of “highly idealized minimal models of the universal,
repeatable features of a system.”14 ese minimal models have a special role in physics
because they can be used to explain universal patterns, common behaviors across material
domains such as pressure, temperature, and critical phenomena. Adding more detail to the
minimal model does not improve the explanations of these patterns; more details only
allow a more thorough characterization of a highly speciﬁc event.

Arguing in a similar

vein, Stephan Hartmann describes cases where highly complicated systems are
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Michael Strevens, “The Causal and Unification Accounts of Explanation Unified—Causally,” Noûs,
XXXVIII, pp. 154-176.
13
Michael Strevens, “Why Explanations Lie: Idealization in Explanation,” unpublished manuscript,
September 2004, p. 26.
14
Robert W. Batterman, “Asymptotics and the Role of Minimal Models,” British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, LIII (2002), 21-38. See also Robert W. Batterman, The Devil in the Details, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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characterized using physical models “of (simple) eﬀective degrees of freedom,” which help
to give us “partial understanding of the relevant mechanisms for the process under study.”
is plays a cognitive role by allowing theorists “to get some insight into the highly
complicated dynamics” of such systems.15
Cartwright’s account of abstraction is also an example of what I call minimalist
idealization.16 On her view, abstraction is a mental operation, where we “strip away—in
our imagination—all that is irrelevant to the concerns of the moment to focus on some
single property or set of properties, ‘as if they were separate.’” If the theorist makes a
mathematical model of this abstract, real phenomenon, then she is in possession of a
minimal model. Such a model can reveal the most important causal powers at the heart of
a phenomenon.17
Despite the diﬀerences between minimalist idealization and Galilean idealization,
minimalist idealizers could in principle produce an identical model to Galilean idealizers.
For example, imagine that we wanted to model the vibrational properties of a covalent
bond. A standard way to do this is to use a harmonic oscillator model. is model treats
the vibrating bond as spring-like with a natural vibrational frequency due to a restoring
force. is is a very simple representation of the vibrational properties of a covalent bond,
but one that is commonly used in spectroscopy. Galilean idealizers would justify the use of
this model by saying that it is pragmatically useful for calculating energies, thus avoiding
having to calculate the many-dimensional potential energy surface for the whole
molecule. Minimalist idealizers, however, would justify the use of this model by
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Stephan Hartmann, “Idealization in Quantum Field Theory,” in N. Shanks (ed.), Idealization in
Contemporary Physics, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), pp.99-122.
16
Cartwright distinguishes this view from what she calls idealization, which is closer to Galilean
idealization. In a more recent defense of this distinction, Martin Jones has cogently argued that abstraction
is best seen as a kind of omission, whereas idealization is the assertion of falsehood. Cartwright’s and
Jones’ proposal is perfectly reasonable—omission and distortion are distinguishable practices. However,
since I am arguing for pluralism about the nature of idealization, I see no reason why we should not treat
minimalist modeling as a form of idealization. See Martin R. Jones, “Idealization and Abstraction: A
Framework,” in M.R. Jones and N. Cartwright (eds.), Idealization XII: Correcting The Model. Idealization
and Abstraction in the Sciences (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005), pp.173-217 for a careful defense of the
alternative view. Also see Paul Humphreys, “Abstract and Concrete,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, LV (1995), pp. 157-161 for a criticism of Cartwright’s view and an argument that idealization (in
Cartwright’s sense) will almost always come along with abstraction in real scientific contexts.
17
Cartwright, Nature’s Capacities, p. 187.
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suggesting that it captures what really matters about the vibrations of covalent bonds. e
extra detail in the full potential energy surface, they would argue, is extraneous.
As this example illustrates, the most important diﬀerences between Galilean and
minimalist idealization are the ways that they are justiﬁed. Even when they produce the
same representations, they can be distinguished by the rationales they give for
idealization. Further, while Galilean idealization ought to abate as science progresses, this
is not the case for minimalist idealization. Progress in science and increases in
computational power should drive the two apart, even if they generate the same model at
a particular time.
Just as there is no single account of minimalist idealization, there is no single
account of its justiﬁcation. However, all of the inﬂuential accounts described above agree
that minimalist idealization should be justiﬁed with respect to the cognitive role of
minimal models: they aid in scientiﬁc explanations. Hartmann argues that minimal
models literally tell us how phenomena behave in a simpler world than our own. is
gives us the necessary information to explain real-world phenomena. For Batterman,
minimal models demonstrate how fundamental structural properties of a system generate
common patterns among disparate phenomena. Strevens and Cartwright look at things
more causally, describing the role of minimal models as showing us the causal factors that
bring about the phenomenon of interest. In all of these cases, minimalist idealization is
connected to scientiﬁc explanation. Minimal models isolate the explanatorily causal
factors either directly (Cartwright and Strevens), asymptotically (Batterman), or via
counterfactual reasoning (Hartmann). In each case, the key to explanation is a special set
of explanatorily privileged causal factors. Minimalist idealization is what isolates these
causes and thus plays a crucial role for explanation. is means that unlike Galilean
idealization, minimalist idealization is not at all pragmatic and we should not expect it to
abate with the progress of science.
Multiple Models Idealization
Multiple-models idealization (hereaer, MMI) is the practice of building multiple
related but incompatible models, each of which makes distinct claims about the nature
and causal structure giving rise to a phenomenon. MMI is similar to minimalist
8

idealization in that it is not justiﬁed by the possibility of de-idealization back to the full
representation. However, it diﬀers from both Galilean and minimalist idealization in not
expecting a single best model to be generated. is type of idealization is most closely
associated with a distinctive kind of theorizing called modeling18 or model-based science19.
One most commonly encounters MMI in sciences dealing with highly complex
phenomena. In ecology, for example, one ﬁnds theorists constructing multiple models of
phenomena such as predation, each of which contains diﬀerent idealizing assumptions,
approximations, and simpliﬁcations. Chemists continue to rely on both the molecular
orbital and valence bond models of chemical bonding, which make diﬀerent,
incompatible assumptions. In a dramatic example of MMI, the United States National
Weather Service employs three complex models of global circulation patterns to model
the weather. Each of these models contains diﬀerent idealizing assumptions about the
basic physical processes involved in weather formation. Although attempts have been
made to build a single model of global weather, the NWS has determined that the best
way to make high ﬁdelity predictions is to employ all three models, despite the
considerable expense of doing so.20
e literature about MMI is less well-developed then the others, so there is less of a
clear consensus about its justiﬁcation. But one especially important justiﬁcation of MMI
is the existence of tradeoﬀs, a position closely associated with biologist Richard Levins and
his philosophical allies.21 is justiﬁcation begins by noting that theorists have diﬀerent
goals for their representations, such as accuracy, precision, generality and simplicity.
Levins further argues that these desiderata and others can trade oﬀ with one another in
18

Weisberg, “Who is a Modeler?”
Peter Godfrey-Smith, “The Strategy of Model Based Science,” Biology and Philosophy, XXI (2006),
pp.725-640.
20
Details about the three primary models, as well as a number of others employed by the NWS can be
found at http://www.meted.ucar.edu/nwp/pcu2.
21
Richard Levins, “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology,” in E. Sober (Ed.), Conceptual
Issues in Evolutionary Biology (first edition), (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), pp. 18-27. Jay
Odenbaugh, “Complex Systems, Trade-Offs and Mathematical Modeling: A Response to Sober and
Orzack,” Philosophy of Science , LXX (2003), pp. 1496–1507. Michael Weisberg, “Qualitative Theory and
Chemical Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, LXXI (2004), pp. 1071-1081; “Forty Years of ‘The
Strategy’: Levins on Model Building and Idealization,” Biology and Philosophy, XXI (2006), pp.623-645.
John Matthewson and Michael Weisberg, “The Structure of Tradeoffs in Scientific Modeling,” manuscript.
For a critique of these ideas, see Steven H. Orzack and Elliott Sober, “A Critical Assessment of Levins’
‘The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology,’” Quarterly Review of Biology, LXVIII (1993),
pp. 533-546.
19
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certain circumstances, meaning that no single model can have all of these properties to
the highest magnitude. If a theorist wants to achieve high degrees of generality, accuracy,
precision, and simplicity, she will need to construct multiple models. Levins summarizes
his discussion of these issues as follows:
e multiplicity of models is imposed by the contradictory demands of a complex,
heterogeneous nature and a mind that can only cope with few variables at a time;
by the contradictory desiderata of generality, realism, and precision; by the need
to understand and also to control; even by the opposing esthetic standards which
emphasize the stark simplicity and power of a general theorem as against the
richness and the diversity of living nature. ese conﬂicts are irreconcilable.
erefore, the alternative approaches even of contending schools are part of a
larger mixed strategy. But the conﬂict is about method, not nature, for the
individual models, while they are essential for understanding reality, should not be
confused with that reality itself.22
Our cognitive limitations, the complexity of the world, and constraints imposed by logic,
mathematics, and the nature of representation, conspire against simultaneously achieving
all of our scientiﬁc desiderata. us, according to Levins, communities of scientists should
construct multiple models, which collectively can satisfy our scientiﬁc needs.
Several other justiﬁcations for MMI can be found in the literature. William
Wimsatt argues that highly idealized models are important because, taken together, they
help us develop truer theories.23 Population biologists Robert May and Joan Roughgarden
argue that clusters of simple models increase the generality of a theoretical framework,
which can lead to greater explanatory depth.24 Finally, Strevens’ account of idealization
can also be used to justify MMI. For Strevens, a theorist ﬁrst ﬁnds a minimal causal model
for a phenomenon of interest. She idealizes when she makes this highly abstract model
more concrete, and in doing so introduces (non-diﬀerence making) distortions. e
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Levins, “The Strategy,” p. 431.
William Wimsatt, “False Models as a Means to Truer Theories,” in M. Nitecki and A. Hoffmann (Eds.),
Neutral models in biology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.23-55.
24
Jonathan Roughgarden, Theory of Population Genetics and Evolutionary Ecology: An
Introduction, (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1979). Robert M. May, Stability and Complexity In
Model Ecosystems (Landmarks in Biology edition), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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processes of ﬁlling in the minimal causal model with concrete details can be carried out in
diﬀerent ways, hence this process can yield multiple, idealized models.
Some of these motivations suggest strong parallels between MMI and minimalist
idealization. In some cases, one cannot build a single minimal model that contains all of
the core causal factors for a class of phenomena. Yet it may be possible, in such cases, to
build a small set of models, each of which highlights a diﬀerent factor and which together
account for all of the core causal factors. is motivation for MMI is parallel to the
motivation for minimalist idealization, even though the practice itself is diﬀerent.
However, there are additional motivations for engaging in MMI that do not
parallel the motivation for minimalist idealization. For example, modelers may engage in
MMI strictly for the purpose of maximizing predictive power, as do the forecasters at the
National Weather Service. Another instance of MMI may involve building a set of
models that gives maximum generality, at the expense of capturing all of the core causal
factors. Still another is the synthetic chemist or engineer’s motivation for MMI: to ﬁnd
the set of idealized models that is maximally useful for creating new structures. ere are
thus many motivations for MMI. Some are pragmatic, where scientists are focused on
prediction and structure construction, while some are explanatory and non-pragmatic.
MMI also gives a complex, mixed answer about the permanence of idealization as
science progresses. In some domains, MMI may abate with the progress of science. e
National Weather Service may one day discover a single model that makes optimal
predictions. However, if tradeoﬀs exist between theoretically important desiderata in a
particular domain, then we should not expect MMI to abate with further progress. ese
tradeoﬀs are consequences of logic and mathematics and thus present a permanent
justiﬁcation for MMI.
From the discussion so far, it may seem that the literature on idealization describes a
hodgepodge of disparate practices, leaving no hope for any further analysis of idealization
simpliciter. is worry is not without merit because the methods, goals, and justiﬁcations
of these three forms of idealization are quite distinct. Although a fully uniﬁed account of
the three kinds of idealization is impossible, some progress can be made towards
developing a uniﬁed framework with which to understand the practice of idealization in
11

general. is framework focuses on the goals associated with idealization, rather than the
activities or products of it. I call these goals the representational ideals of idealization.

II. Representational Ideals
Representational ideals are the goals governing the construction, analysis, and
evaluation of theoretical models. ey regulate which factors are to be included in models,
set up the standards theorists use to evaluate their models, and guide the direction of
theoretical inquiry. Representational ideals can be thought of as having two components:
inclusion rules and ﬁdelity rules. Inclusion rules tell the theorist which kinds of properties
of the phenomenon of interest, or target system, must be included in the model, while
ﬁdelity rules concern the degrees of precision and accuracy with which each part of the
model is to be judged.
An important, albeit very simple, representational ideal is called COMPLETENESS,
which is associated with classic accounts of scientiﬁc method. As such, it forms an
important background against which every kind of idealization can be discussed.
COMPLETENESS
According to COMPLETENESS, the best theoretical description of a phenomenon is
a complete representation. e relevant sense of ‘completeness’ has two components
associated with its inclusion rules and ﬁdelity rules, respectively. e inclusion rules state
that each property of the target phenomenon must be included in the model.
Additionally, anything external to the phenomenon that gives rise to its properties must
also be included in the model. Finally, structural and causal relationships within the target
phenomenon must be reﬂected in the structure of the model. COMPLETENESS’ ﬁdelity
rules tell the theorist that the best model is one that represents every aspect of the target
system and its exogenous causes with an arbitrarily high degree of precision and accuracy.
e description of COMPLETENESS given so far is accurate, but potentially
misleading. With very few exceptions, the inclusion and ﬁdelity rules of COMPLETENESS
set a goal that is impossible to achieve. Unless extremely self deceived, or in possession of
an extremely simple and abstract target system, no theorist thinks that complete
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representation is actually possible. Given the impossibility of achieving complete
representation, how can COMPLETENESS play a guiding role in scientiﬁc inquiry?
Despite it unattainable demands, COMPLETENESS can guide inquiry in two ways.
First, COMPLETENESS sets up a scale with which one can evaluate all representations
including sub-optimal ones. If a theorist wants to rank several representations of the same
phenomenon and has adopted COMPLETENESS, she has a straightforward way to do so. e
closer a representation comes to completeness, the better it scores. I call this the evaluative
function of the representational ideal because it sets the standards for evaluating suboptimal representations.
e second and more important way that COMPLETENESS can guide inquiry is
through its regulative function. Regulative functions are similar to what Kant called
regulative ideals. ey do not describe a cognitive achievement that is literally possible,
rather, they describe a target or aim point. ey give the theorist guidance about what she
should strive for and the proper direction for the advancement of her research program. If
a theorist adopts COMPLETENESS, she knows that she should always strive to add more
detail, more complexity, and more precision to her models. is will bring her closer to
the ideal of completeness, although she will never fully realize this goal.
COMPLETENESS is a unique representational ideal because it directs theorists to
include everything in their representations. All other ideals will build in some aspect of
approximation or distortion. In thinking about ideals other than COMPLETENESS, we can
begin to see the outline of a framework for characterizing the three kinds of idealization.
Diﬀerent kinds of idealization will be associated with diﬀerent representational ideals.
Before we carry this analysis forward, let us consider several additional representational
ideals.
SIMPLICITY
Aer COMPLETENESS, the next most straightforward ideal is SIMPLICITY. e
inclusion rule for this ideal councils the theorist to include as little as possible, while still
being consistent with the ﬁdelity rules. e ﬁdelity rule for SIMPLICITY demands a
qualitative match between the behavior of target system and the properties and dynamics
of the model.
13

SIMPLICITY is primarily employed by working scientists in two contexts.25 e
ﬁrst is pedagogical. Students are oen introduced to the simplest possible model that can
make sense of the data, even where scientists believe that the model contains serious
problems. One example of this is in the Lewis electron pair model of chemical bonding.
is model is not even quantum mechanical, yet it can be used to account for many
canonical molecular structures. Beginning students are introduced to this model as a way
of building intuitions about chemical structure and reactivity.
e second scientiﬁc context where SIMPLICITY is employed is when theorists
construct models to test general ideas. “A minimal model for an idea tries to illuminate a
hypothesis … [It] is not intended to be tested literally, any more than one would test
whether the models for a frictionless pulley or a frictionless inclined plane are wrong.” 26
is second use represents a motivation and justiﬁcation for a particular kind of modeling
in scientiﬁc practice. eorists oen begin a project by trying to determine what kind of
minimal structures could generate a property of interest. ey do not need to know, at
ﬁrst, how a speciﬁc target system actually works. Once the dynamics are understood in
simple models, theorists examine more complex models and empirical data to assess the
plausibility of the simple model’s explanation of a real system’s behavior.
1-CAUSAL
is representational ideal instructs the theorist to include in the model only the
core or primary causal factors that give rise to the phenomenon of interest. Put in the
language of the causation literature, this ideal tells the theorist to only include the factors
that made a diﬀerence. e theorist constructs a mathematical model of a much simpler
system than the one actually being studied, one that excludes higher order causal factors.
ese are the factors which make no diﬀerence to the occurrence of the phenomenon, but

25

There is also a long tradition which investigates the epistemic role of simple models. In some
circumstances, it seems that simple models ought to be preferred because they are more likely to be true.
This is a different kind of justification for the use of simple models than I am discussing in this article. For
a recent defense of the possible epistemic significance of simplicity, see Malcom Forster and Eliott Sober,
“How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate
Predictions,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, XLV (1994), pp. 1-35.
26
Joan Roughgarden, Primer of Ecological Theory, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. x.

14

control the precise way in which the phenomenon occurs.27 is is closely related to
SIMPLICITY, but unlike SIMPLICITY, 1-CAUSAL restricts the level of simplicity that is
allowed. If we are trying to construct the simplest possible model that can make
predictions qualitatively compatible with our observations, there is no restriction on the
kind or number of causal factors that must be included. SIMPLICITY, for example, may
allow us to neglect all quantum mechanical eﬀects and use the Lewis model. 1-CAUSAL,
however, would not sanction the use of such a model because it requires the theorist to
include the quantum mechanical interactions that compose the core physical explanation
of the structure.
1-CAUSAL’s ﬁdelity criteria make a considerable diﬀerence in determining when
the theorist has constructed an adequate model because its inclusion rule (restriction to
primary causal factors) is not very speciﬁc. In addition, the ﬁneness of speciﬁcation of the
target phenomenon itself will make a diﬀerence to the kind of model we can build.
Imagine that we wanted to build a 1-CAUSAL model for the maintenance of the sex ratio.
We would need a more complex model to explain the 1.05:1 ratio of male to female
Homo sapiens, than if we only were interested in why the sex ratio is roughly 50:50. Even
holding the ﬁdelity criteria ﬁxed, the best model would be diﬀerent in these two cases,
with the former requiring greater speciﬁcation of internal and external causal factors.
Models generated using 1-CAUSAL are especially useful in two contexts. Like the
models generated with SIMPLE, they can be used as starting points for the formulation and
analysis of more complex models. 1-CAUSAL models are typically generated when one has
a reasonably comprehensive understanding of how a system behaves, since knowing the
primary causal factors that give rise to a phenomenon requires knowing quite a lot about
the system. Further modeling from this point is usually aimed at greater quantitative
accuracy, not deeper fundamental understanding.
e second context where 1-CAUSAL is especially important involves scientiﬁc
explanation. Several recent philosophical accounts of scientiﬁc explanation have pointed
to the central role that primary causal factors—the factors that really make a diﬀerence—
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play in scientiﬁc explanation.28 Recent work on the cognitive psychology of explanation
has also emphasized the crucial role that picking out central causal factors plays in people’s
judgments of explanatory goodness.29 In their methodological discussions, a number of
other scientists have commented on this connection. For example, chemist Roald
Hoﬀmann emphasizes that “… if understanding is sought, simpler models, not
necessarily the best and predicting all observables in detail, will have value. Such models
may highlight important causes and channels.” 30 ese accounts all suggest that models
generated with 1-CAUSAL seem to be at the heart of theorists’ explanatory practices.
MAXOUT
We now move from an ideal which looks superﬁcially like SIMPLICITY to one that
looks superﬁcially like COMPLETENESS, the ideal called MAXOUT. is ideal says that the
theorist should maximize the precision and accuracy of the model’s output. It says
nothing, however, about how this is to be accomplished.
One way to work towards this ideal is by constructing highly accurate models of
every property and causal factor aﬀecting the target. is is the same approach taken in
COMPLETENESS, although the goal of MAXOUT is to achieve maximum output precision
and accuracy, not a complete representation. A second option, one more commonly
associated with MAXOUT , is to engage in model selection31, a process of using statistics to
choose a functional form, parameter set, and parameter values which best ﬁt a large data
set. e model selected by these techniques is then continually optimized as further data
comes in. Finally, MAXOUT also sanctions the use of black box models, the sort that have
amazing predictive power, but for unknown reasons. ese may be discovered using
model selection techniques, or may be discovered in a more serendipitous fashion.
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At ﬁrst blush, it may seem unscientiﬁc to adopt an ideal that values predictive
power over everything else. Most scientists believe that their inquiry is aimed at more
than raw predictive power. While scientists want to know how a system will behave in the
future, they also want an explanation of why it behaves the way that it does. MAXOUT
ensures that we will generate models which are useful for predicting future states of the
target system, but gives no guarantee that the models will be useful for explaining the
behavior of the system.
Nevertheless, representations generated by MAXOUT have their place in scientiﬁc
inquiry. Explanation and prediction are clearly both important goals of scientists, but
there is no reason that they must both be fulﬁlled with the same model. Theorists can
adopt a mixed representational strategy, using diﬀerent kinds of models to achieve
diﬀerent scientiﬁc goals. It may also be rational to elevate predictive power above all other
considerations in some situations. Following his reﬂection on the importance of simple
models quoted above, Hoﬀmann argues that “If predictability is sought at all cost—and
realities of marketplace and judgments of the future of humanity may demand this—then
simplicity may be irrelevant.”32
P-GENERAL
Generality is a desideratum of most models. is desideratum really has two
distinct parts: a-generality and p-generality. A-generality is the number of actual targets a
particular model applies to given the theorist’s adopted ﬁdelity criteria. P-generality,
however, is the number of possible, but not necessarily actual, targets a particular model
captures.33 e representational ideal P-GENERAL says that considerations of p-generality
should drive the construction and evaluation of theoretical models.
While a-generality may seem like the more important kind of generality, theorists
are oen interested in p-generality for several reasons. P-general models can be part of
the most widely applicable theoretical frameworks, allowing real and non-real target
systems to be compared. P-generality is also oen thought to be associated with
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explanatory power. is can be seen in both the philosophical literature on explanation
and in the comments of theorists. An excellent example of this can be found in R. A.
Fisher’s discussion of modeling the non-actual. He begins by quoting Arthur Eddington:
We need scarcely add that the contemplation in natural science of a wider
domain than the actual leads to a far better understanding of the actual.34
Fisher goes on to argue:
[for] a biologist, speaking of his own subject, [this] would suggest an
extraordinarily wide outlook. No practical biologist interest in sexual reproduction
would be led to work out the detailed consequences experienced by organisms
having three or more sexes; yet what else should he do if he wishes to understand
why the sexes are, in fact, always two?35
e key to understanding this actual system, Fisher argues, is to understand a possible, but
non-actual one. In the behavior of this non-actual three-sex system lies the key to
understanding why the two-sex system evolved. Some recent philosophical accounts of
scientiﬁc explanation also stress the importance of p-generality to explanation.36
P-GENERAL can also play a subtler regulative role. Instead of trying to understand
speciﬁc targets, theorists may wish to understand fundamental relationships or
interactions, abstracted away from real systems. For example, ecologists may wish to study
predation or competition, far removed from the interactions of particular species. In such
cases, P-GENERAL is oen adopted, guiding theorists to develop models that can be
applied to many real and possible targets. is exploratory activity is a very important
part of modern theoretical practice, although we do not yet have good philosophical
account of how it works.37 One thing we do know, however, is that there is a delicate
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balance between achieving deep and insightful p-generality and low-ﬁdelity,
uninformative p-generality, generated by overly simplistic models.

We have now looked at a number of representational ideals, the goals that guide
theoretical inquiry. As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, representational
ideals are at the core of the practice of idealization and a systematic account of them can
ultimately lead us to a more uniﬁed understanding of idealization. To that end, we now
turn back to the three kinds of idealization and consider which representational ideals are
associated with them.

III. Idealization and Representational Ideals
Recall that Galilean idealization is the practice of introducing distortions into
theories in order to simplify them and make them computationally tractable. It is justiﬁed
pragmatically, introduced to make a model more computationally tractable, but with the
ultimate intention of de-idealizing, removing any distortion, and adding detail back to
the model. Models generated by Galilean idealization are thus approximate, but carry with
them the intention of further revision, ultimately reaching for a more precise, accurate,
and complete model. e ultimate goal of Galilean idealization is complete
representation; its representational ideal is thus COMPLETENESS.
Minimalist idealizers are not interested in generating the most truthful or accurate
model. Rather, they are concerned with ﬁnding minimal models, discovering the core
factors responsible for the target phenomenon. Minimalist idealizers thus adopt the
representational ideal 1-CAUSAL, the ideal that says the best model is the one that includes
the primary causal factors that account for the phenomenon of interest, up to a suitable
level of ﬁdelity chosen by the theorist. While Minimalist idealizers may sometime look
like they are adopting SIMPLICITY, this is almost always inaccurate, because theorists
engage in minimalist idealization to really understand how the target phenomena work
and why they behave the way that they do. is requires ﬁnding the causal factors that
really do make a diﬀerence, not a model that simply can reproduce the phenomenon
qualitatively.
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Like Galilean idealization’s representational ideal, minimalist idealization’s ideal
also demands the construction of a single model for a particular target or class of target
phenomena. One typically engages in minimalist idealization in order to generate
explanatory models. Such models tend to be ones that simultaneously unify many target
phenomena into a class and identify the causal factors which really make a diﬀerence. For
the class of phenomenon of interest, this will mean ﬁnding a single model, despite the
fact that it will leave out quite a lot of detail which accounts for the uniqueness of each
target.
Finally, we can consider MMI. e biggest diﬀerence between MMI and the other
kinds of idealization is that there is no single representational ideal which is characteristic
of it. Pretty much any representational ideal—including 1-CAUSAL and in rare cases
COMPLETENESS —can play a role in this form of idealization. MMI arises because of the
existence of tradeoﬀs between diﬀerent theoretical desiderata. is suggests that not all
desiderata are simultaneously maximizable, at least in a single model. us the most
signiﬁcant aspect of MMI is that it instructs theorists to construct a series of models which
pursue diﬀerent desiderata and are guided by multiple representational ideals.
Consider, for example, the ecological research program that is concerned with
understanding predation. A cursory look at the ecological literature on predation, reveals
little in the way of the search for a single, best model of predation. Instead, one ﬁnds a
series of models, some of which are more precise and accurate, some of which are more
qualitative, some of which are very well suited for populations that are homogenously
distributed in space, and some of which are ﬂexible enough to deal with complex spatial
structure. is situation is the norm in theoretical ecology. As John Maynard Smith
explained, “For the discovery of general ideas in ecology … diﬀerent kinds of
mathematical description, which may be called models, are called for.”38
For modern ecologists pursuing MMI, a full understanding of the ecological world
is going to depend on multiple, overlapping, possibly incompatible models. How might
we justify this kind of pluralism? One possible approach is anti-realist. We could argue
that maximizing empirical adequacy in some cases requires the use of multiple models.
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Since anti-realism only requires that models be empirically adequate, the use of diﬀerent
kinds of idealized models is unproblematic.
is line of response is available to anti-realists, but neglects some of the
motivations for building multiple models that theorists have discussed in the literature.
e same ecologists who champion the use of multiple models very explicitly describe this
practice as aimed at having a more complete understanding of the phenomena of interest,
not simply making accurate predictions. As Levins puts it, “[O]ur truth is at the
intersection of independent lies.”39 is is clearly a realist sentiment. To understand if it is
justiﬁed we must ask whether the use of multiple idealized models, or the use of any
idealized models at all, is compatible with scientiﬁc realism.

IV. Idealization, Representational Ideals, and the Aims of Science
Peter Godfrey-Smith gives the following helpful formulation of scientiﬁc realism:
“One actual and reasonable aim of science is to give us accurate descriptions (and other
representations) of what reality is like. is project includes giving us accurate
representations of aspects of reality that are unobservable.”40 e realist thus believes that
scientists aim and sometimes succeed at representing this external, independent reality,
while anti-realists demur, at least when it comes to unobservables.
Prima facie, idealization looks like it might cause problems for scientiﬁc realism.
All three forms of idealization involve the willful distortion of scientiﬁc representations.
Willful distortion and approximation appears to militate against Godfrey-Smith’s
conception of realism, because the theorist is not even aiming to give an accurate
description of what mind-independent reality is like. Despite this, I think all three kinds
of idealization are compatible with the sort of realism sketched by Godfrey-Smith, if his
deﬁnition is understood in a broad and sophisticated way.
Galilean idealization is the most straightforwardly compatible with scientiﬁc
realism. Galilean idealizers oen fall short of their representational ideal of COMPLETENESS
and may even do so willingly. However, in the long run, the Galilean idealizer does aim
to give complete, non-distorted, perfectly accurate representations. In order to
39
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accommodate the possibility of Galilean idealization, scientiﬁc realists need to understand
that achieving accurate representations of complex phenomena is an ongoing process.
Even when the short-term practice involves the willful introduction of distortion, the
long-term aim can still be to give an accurate representation of what reality is really like.
us scientiﬁc realism is perfectly compatible with Galilean idealization, if the realist aim
is understood to be long-term or ultimate.
Minimalist idealization and MMI present more serious challenges to scientiﬁc
realism. It will not be possible for minimalist and MMI idealizers to assent to at least one
interpretation of Godfrey-Smith’s formulation because they do not ever aim to give a
fully accurate representation of reality. However, defenders of minimalist idealization aim
to uncover real causal structure, or fundamental patterns in common between multiple
phenomena. is suggests that a weaker reading of Godfrey-Smith’s formulation, which
does not require fully accurate representations, is compatible with minimalist idealization.
ere are other respects in which minimalist idealization is compatible, and indeed
demands a kind of realism. Consider the goals and justiﬁcation of minimalist idealization:
Minimalist idealizers are trying to model the most important causal factors that underlie
the properties and behaviors of target phenomena. at is, they oen recognize that real
scientiﬁc explanation involves the identiﬁcation of the core causal factors giving rise to
the system, not all of the details. is recognition is surely a realist one. While minimalist
idealizers are decidedly not interested in the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, they want to know the truth about what really matters. For their explanatory
interests, representation of just a few key factors is what matters. is representation must
be accurate.
Finally, consider multiple models idealization. As this constitutes a more diverse
set of practices, it is much harder to make a uniﬁed judgment about the degree of realism
embodied by MMI. Some kinds of representational ideals are clearly not realist. For
example, the ideal MAXOUT tells the theorist that she should seek maximal precision and
accuracy in the output of her model. However, this ideal provides no guidance about the
internal structure of the model and is compatible with black-box models. MAXOUT is also
compatible with models that are willfully distorted with the sole aim of making the
predictions more accurate. So clearly a practice of idealization that only uses MAXOUT is
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incompatible with realism. In such a case, theorists do not aim to give accurate
representations of the underlying reality of their target phenomena.
As I described it, however, MMI transcends relying on any one kind of
representational ideal. It is a strategy for investigating phenomena when complexity and
tradeoﬀs preclude the accomplishment of this in a single model. When a theorist chooses
to engage in MMI because her system is complex, but nevertheless wants to develop an
accurate description of her target phenomenon, she is acting in a realist fashion. At least
one aim of her practice is the development of a mind-independent picture of a real-world
phenomenon. is attitude is also clearly realist in spirit, despite the fact that it will be
strictly incompatible with Godfrey-Smith’s deﬁnition of realism.
Indeed, there can be several realist dimensions of MMI. Typical episodes of MMI
employ a package of representational ideals, which taken together, aim to give an accurate
representation of real world systems. While no single model may contain the complete
picture of the properties and behavior of a complex system, a collection of them can.
Levins and Maynard Smith advocate the use of multiple models precisely because a
collection of ecological models will give a more accurate representation of the behavior of
real world ecosystems then any single one does.
e recognition that multiple models can give a more accurate and informative
representation of real world systems is itself another realist dimension of MMI, in fact
one might call it a higher order realist motivation for MMI. Multiple models idealization
is justiﬁed by the existence of tradeoﬀs between theoretically important desiderata such a
simplicity, accuracy, precision, and generality. If these tradeoﬀs exist in the way many
scientists and philosophers believe that they do, adopting theoretical strategies that
recognize them is the proper realist response. Where tradeoﬀs exist, the realist should not
be content to choose a single, most accurate model. Such a strategy ignores important
discoveries about the world, in this case about our representational capacities. When faced
with tradeoﬀs and complex systems, the realist should surely follow the Levinsonian
strategy of multiple-model use.
e goal of this discussion of realism is to show that, despite prima facie concerns
about the incompatibility of idealization and realism, all three kinds of idealization can be
made compatible with sophisticated forms of realism. A more detailed study of these issues
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would look more carefully at each representational ideal and consider the extent to which
its ﬁdelity criteria and inclusion rules are compatible with realism and other scientiﬁc
desiderata.

What, then, have we learned about idealization and its justiﬁcation? I have
endeavored to show that the three kinds of idealization recognized in the philosophical
literature are not competitors, but reﬂect three practices important to scientiﬁc inquiry.
What distinguishes them is not the product of their application, but rather the
representational ideals which guide theorists in using them. ere is no single, overarching justiﬁcation for idealization. Diﬀering representational ideals respond to the
demands of a complex world in diﬀerent ways. is precludes a single justiﬁcation for
idealization.
####
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